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I. INTRODUCTION
Society's concern with the sexual abuse of children has grown
rapidly as the number of reported cases have multiplied and attracted
national attention. Nationally, the statistics estimate that fifteen to forty
percent' of children have been sexually abused, although many inci-
dents are never reported. The West Virginia statistics comport with the
national averages; approximately fifteen to twenty percent of all child
abuse and neglect proceedings allege some type of sexual abuse.2 In
fact, child sexual abuse is "the fastest growing category of reported
child maltreatment." 3
As the number of reports of child sexual abuse rise, courts have
become increasingly aware of the tension between the need to protect
the rights of the defendant and the need to modify evidentiary stan-
dards to meet the special problems of sexually abused child witnesses.
In West Virginia, the evidentiary standards have been significantly
modified in several areas of the law to accommodate the needs of
child witnesses.
This Note addresses four evidentiary areas which have undergone
substantial modification in child sexual abuse cases in West Virginia.
Part II examines the current standards for evaluating a child's compe-
tency, and suggests an approach better adapted to the special problems
facing both the child and the defendant in child molestation prosecu-
tions. Part Ill explores the various exceptions to the general exclusion
of character evidence, and analyzes those exceptions which threaten to
erode the foundations of the rule itself. Part IV criticizes the overly
generous admission of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases as
invading the -province of the jury and unfairly bolstering the prose-
1. DEBRA WHTcomB, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WHEN THE VICrIM IS A CHILD
3 (2d ed. 1992).
2. Telephone Interview with Michael O'Farrell, Division Director of Services to Fam-
ilies and Children, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (Apr. 13,
1993). The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources is currently working
with the Juvenile Justice Committee of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to
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cution's case. Part V evaluates the extent to which three hearsay ex-
ceptions have been modified in child sexual abuse cases, concluding
that the exceptions have been stretched to their reasonable limits.
II. COMPETENCE AND CREDiBILrrY
A. Presumption of Competency
The competence of the child victim is often challenged when the
child's testimony is offered in court. Because the child victim is fre-
quently the only witness to the sexual abuse, the prosecution may face
insurmountable barriers in presenting its case if the child is prevented
from testifying due to a finding of incompetence.4
Under the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, every person is pre-
sumed competent to testify.5 Furthermore, the West Virginia Code
provides that child victims of sexual abuse are presumptively compe-
tent to testify.
6
Despite the legislative pronouncements favoring a presumption of
competence for child sexual abuse victims, trial judges still exercise a
wide degree of latitude in evaluating and excluding a child's testimony
if competency standards are not met.7 The child's competency may be
challenged either because the child does not understand the distinction
between truth and falsity or because the child's testimony is inherently
incredible due to psychological factors!
B. Traditional Basis for Challenging a Child's Competence
Inability to distinguish between truth and falsity is a traditional
and favored basis for challenging the competency of a child's testimo-
4. ROSS EATMAN & JOSEPHINE BULKLEY, NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENT FOR
CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, PROTECTING CHILD VICTIM/VITNESSES 37 (1986).
5. "Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided for by
statute or these rules." W. VA. R. EVID. 601.
6. "In any prosecution under this article, neither age nor mental capacity of the
victim shall preclude the victim from testifying." W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11(c) (1984).
7. See B. ANTHONY MOROSCO, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES
§ 9.04, at 9-11 to 9-12 (1988).
8. State v. Ayers, 369 S.E.2d 22, 26 (W. Va. 1988).
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ny.9 If the defendant challenges the child's competence on this basis,
the trial judge should hold an in camera hearing to qualify the child
as a witness before any testimony is elicited.1" The trial judge may
take into account the age, intelligence, capacity, and moral accountabil-
ity of the child witness in determining whether the child understands
the difference between the truth and a lie." If the trial judge finds
that the child cannot distinguish truth from falsity, the child must be
barred from testifying. This is not a special rule for child witnesses,
but a rule which prohibits any such unreliable witness from testifying.
However, defense lawyers often successfully prevent very young wit-
nesses from testifying by asserting this traditional challenge.
C. The "Inherently Incredible" Challenge
When a defendant alleges that a child's testimony is inherently
incredible due to psychological factors, the trial judge has the discre-
tion to order a psychological evaluation to determine whether the child
is competent to testify. The use of a psychological evaluation to deter-
mine a child's psychological competence was first approved by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Burdette v. Lobban,1"
an appeal from a neglect and abuse proceeding. Psychiatric and psy-
chological evaluations of children are statutorily authorized in neglect
and abuse proceedings.13 The court subsequently sanctioned the use of
psychological evaluations in criminal sexual abuse prosecutions." Al-
though a psychological evaluation may be employed to determine com-
9. Id.
10. See State v. Carter, 282 S.E.2d 277, 281 (W. Va. 1981) (noting that the court did
not condone the trial court's failure to conduct an in camera hearing, although it did not
constitute reversible error).
11. State v. Jones, 362 S.E.2d 330, 332 (W. Va. 1987). The validity of a competency
challenge based upon the common law principles is questionable in light of W. VA. R.
EvID. 601 which provides that everyone is presumed competent. See FRANKLIN D.
CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS § 2.2(B) (2d ed. Supp.
1988).
12. 323 S.E.2d 601 (W. Va. 1984).
13. W. VA. CODE § 49-6-4(a) (1984).
14. See State v. Ayers, 369 S.E.2d 22, 25-27 (W. Va. 1988); State v. McPherson, 371
S.E.2d 333, 339-40 (W. Va. 1988).
1094 [V7ol. 95:1091
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petency, the trial judge enjoys considerable discretion in deciding
whether such an evaluation is merited in a particular case.
15
A recent case, State v. Delaney,16 lends guidance to trial judges
to aid in determining when a psychological evaluation should be used
to judge competency by setting forth six factors to be considered: (1)
the nature of the examination requested and the intrusiveness inherent
in that examination; (2) the victim's age; (3) the resulting physical
and/or emotional effects of the examination on the victim; (4) the
probative value of the examination to the issue before the court; (5)
the remoteness in the time of the examination to the alleged criminal
act; (6) the evidence already available for the defendant's use.17
A defendant requesting a psychological evaluation must present the
trial judge with evidence that there is a compelling need or reason for
the examination.18 A traditional challenge to competency based a
child's inability to understand the distinction between truth and falsity
does not merit a psychological profile. 9 Rather, the defendant must
show that due to psychological problems or influences, the minor
might have a subliminal motive to falsely testify.20 Thus, the testi-
mony might be so inherently incredible that the trial judge could prop-
erly exclude the minor witness from testifying if a psychological eval-
uation indicated the innate unreliability of the child's competence.
"Inherent incredibility" has been defined as more than contradic-
tion and lack of corroboration; the testimony must defy physical laws
and be completely untrustworthy. 21 The "inherent incredibility" stan-
dard serves two related evidentiary standards. If the child's testimony
is found inherently incredible, the trial judge may (1) declare the child
incompetent as a witness and exclude the testimony altogether, or (2)
15. Ayers, 369 S.E.2d at 26-27.
16. 417 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1992).
17. Id. at syl. pt. 3.
18. Id.
19. State v. McPherson, 371 S.E.2d 333, 340 (W. Va. 1988). If a defendant challeng-
es a child's competence on these grounds, the proper procedure is to conduct an in camera
hearing at which the trial judge evaluates the child's competence to testify. See supra part
U.B.
20. 1d at 339.
21. Id at 338.
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allow the child to testify but require some corroboration of the child's
story. In State v. Beck,22 the court held that a conviction for any sex-
ual offense may be obtained on the uncorroborated testimony of the
victim, and umless such testimony is inherently incredible, the credibili-
ty is a question for the jury.2
Traditionally, the issue of credibility of a witness was wholly
within the jury's province while competence was a matter determined
by the judge. However, as noted in Burdette, the issues of competency
and credibility, which are separable when dealing with adult witnesses,
become blurred when dealing with child witnesses.u The same stan-
dard of "inherent incredibility" is employed to determine both whether
the child witness is competent to testify and whether the witness's
testimony must be corroborated.
D. A New Approach to Competency and Credibility
The current competency_ standards do not address to the special
problems facing both the child and the defendant in child molestation
prosecutions. A better approach suggested by the court in State v.
Stacy is to analyze the testimony under a Rule 403 inquiry, rather
than focusing on competence and credibility. Rule 403 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence states: "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."26 The trial court should weigh
the probative value of the child's testimony against the prejudice re-
sulting from its allowance. Because the testimony of a child who has
been sexually abused will inevitably be highly inflammatory, the trial
court should order a psychological evaluation if the child's testimony
is not clearly reliable. The results of such an evaluation will then aid
22. 286 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 1981).
23. Id at 243.
24. 323 S.E.2d 601, 603 (W. Va. 1984).
25. 371 S.E.2d 614 (W. Va. 1988).
26. Id at 617.
1096 [Vol. 95:1091
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the court in determining whether the probative value of the child's
testimony outweighs the unfair prejudice.27 On the one hand, if the
evaluation indicates that the child's testimony would be inherently
unreliable due to the child's shaky psychological condition, the court
may well find that the substantial prejudicial impact of a child's alle-
gations of sexual abuse far outweighs the marginal value of such testi-
mony. On the other hand, if the evaluation indicates that the child is
psychologically stable, the strong probative value would likely out-
weigh even substantial prejudice.
Additionally, if a psychological evaluation demonstrates factors
that would render the child's testimony unreliable and such testimony
is excluded under Rule 403, the defendant's constitutional' right of
confrontation would be protected. As Justice Neely has noted, the right
of confrontation may be compromised when the defendant's attorney is
unable to effectively cross examine a child witness because psychologi-
cal problems make the child incoherent or non-responsive.2" In that
instance, the evidentiary and statutory provisions for general compe-
tence, while properly rectifying previous arbitrary presumptions against
competency, must yield to the defendant's constitutional right of con-
frontation. 29 Thus, the child must be excluded from testifying alto-
gether according to Rule 403 because the prejudice to the defendant's
right of confrontation outweighs any probative value of the child's
testimony.
III. SnMILAR ACTS
A. The General Rule of Exclusion
Rule 404(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence excludes
evidence of a person's character or a character trait offered to prove
that the person acted consistent with the character or character trait."
27. id.
28. IaL at 619.
29. Md
30. "Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion." W. VA. R. EVID. 404(a).
1993] 1097
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Rule 404(b) further provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show that he acted in conformity therewith.31 Although this rule
would seem to exclude a broad array of evidence that would be useful
in a child sexual abuse prosecution, in practice, much character evi-
dence is admitted against the sexual abuse defendant. In affirmning the
admission of such evidence, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia has relied upon the exceptions stated in Rule 404 and upon
common-law exceptions.
B. Rebuttal Evidence
One such statutory exception is that the prosecution may introduce
character evidence to rebut evidence of a specific trait offered by the
defendant. 32 This exception is supported by Beck, in which the West
Virginia Supreme Court acknowledged that "[w]here the accused takes
the stand or produces witnesses who testify as to his previous good
character in defense of the charge against him, he or they may be
cross-examined on otherwise unconnected and irrelevant matters to
demonstrate his bad character."
33
Additionally, in State v. Gilbert, the defendant waived standing
to object to the admissibility of character evidence where the defendant
called a number of witnesses to testify as to his good reputation in the
community for truthfulness and as to his specific moral character in
regard to sexual activity.3 5 Had the defendant offered only evidence
of his general reputation for veracity, the prosecution could not have
introduced evidence of specific acts. However, because the defendant
introduced testimony as to his sexual morality, which is a specific
trait, evidence of specific acts could be used in rebuttal.
36
31. W. VA. R. EVHD. 404(b).
32. "Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character by an ac-
cused, or by the prosecutor to rebut the same [is admissible to show that the accused acted
in conformity with his character.]" W. VA. R. EvID. 404(a)(1).
33. 286 S.E.2d 234, 242 (W. Va. 1981) (quoting State v. Ramey, 212 S.E.2d 737,
743 (1975)).
34. 399 S.E.2d 851 (W. Va. 1991).
35. Ma. at 858.
36. IM at 859.
1098 [Vol. 95:1091
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In Gilbert, the defendant testified that "he was not the sort of
person to do the sort of thing which she [the victim] charged."' 7 The
defendant then called at least eleven witnesses who testified as to his
good character. These witnesses testified that they had never known
the defendant to sexually contact a child, that he did not engage in
sexual activity outside of marriage, and that he did not engage in
deviant sexual behavior.38 In rebuttal, the State called two witnesses;
one testified that the defendant had walked into her home and placed
his hands upon her breasts, and the other testified that he had tele-
phoned her and said he was coming to visit her and she was going to
like it.39 Although these acts by the defendant are unrelated to the
underlying child molestation issue, they are admissible under Rule
404(1)(a) to rebut the defendant's evidence of his good general charac-
ter and his specific sexual morality. Although Rule 404(1)(a) may be
of some usefulness to prosecutors, realistically most defense attorneys,
being familiar with the rule, will not offer character evidence regarding
sexual traits or activity.
C. Rule 404(b) Exceptions
Another statutory exception to the ban on evidence of collateral
acts is that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissi-
ble to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' The case law defines
these exceptions slightly differently; in Gilbert, the court listed the
following purposes for which evidence of collateral acts might be
admissible: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident;
(4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to estab-
37. lad at 855.
38. Id.
39. It.
40. "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent." W. VA. R. EVID. 404(b).
1993] 1099
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lish the others; and (5) the identity of the person charged with the
commission of the crime on trial.41
The West Virginia Supreme Court has been liberal in upholding
the admission of much collateral acts evidence under the guise of Rule
404(b). For instance, the court upheld the admission of collateral acts
under the "common scheme or plan" exception in Gilbert.42 There,
the victim had been permitted to testify that the defendant had fondled
her on two occasions prior to the first sexual assault charged in the
indictment. The court upheld the admission of this testimony because it
involved acts between the same parties, committed in the same place,
and committed under the same general circumstances as the acts
charged in the indictment.43
Similarly, in State v. Edward Charles L.,4 the court upheld the
admission of certain collateral acts on the theory that the acts showed
absence of mistake or accident.45 The defendant had argued as an
affirmative defense that he might have accidentally touched his son
and daughter while bathing them.' The court held that the following
acts of the defendant were admissible to prove absence of accident:
forcing his children to listen to telephone calls to sex clubs, masturbat-
ing in front of his son, and viewing graphic sexual magazines with his
children.47 The court stated that these acts were also admissible as
evidence of the defendant's intent to molest the victims.
48
D. The "Res Gestae" Exception
Collateral acts evidence may also be admitted under the "res ges-
tae" or same transaction exception. The court developed this exception
prior to the adoption of the federal rules of evidence.
41. State v. Gilbert, 399 S.E.2d 851, 857 (W. Va. 1991).
42. IM.
43. Id.
44. 398 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1990).
45. Id. at 130.
46. Id. at 128.
47. Id. at 129, 130 (the court also relied upon the same transaction or "res gestae"
rule in finding this evidence admissible).
48. Id. at 130.
1100 (Vol. 95:1091
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One of the accepted bases for the admissibility of evidence of other crimes
arises when such evidence, "furnishes part of the context of the crime" or
is so intimately connected with and explanatory of the crime charged
against the defendant and is so much a part of the setting of the case and
its "environment" that its proof is appropriate in order to complete the
story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context or the "res
gestae" or the uncharged offense is so linked together in point of time and
circumstances with the crime charged that one cannot be fully shown
without proving the other ... [and is thus] part of the res gestae of the
crime charged.49
In Edward Charles L, which was decided after the adoption of
the federal rules of evidence, the court admitted the same collateral
acts evidence which it had already admitted as proof of absence of
accident on the alternative grounds that the acts were part of the "res
gestae" of the crime. The acts that occurred in the presence of the
children or as part of the molestation of the children were admissible
because "the acts were so intrinsically related to the alleged offenses
that they may be considered as part of the transactions with the chil-
dren and so interwoven with his pattern of conduct toward the children
that they are part of the res gestae of the crimes charged.950
Likewise, the court employed the res gestae argument to uphold
the admission of evidence in Gilbert.51 The victim had testified that
while she was engaging in sex with the defendant, the defendant had
interrupted the act and engaged in an act of bestiality with his pet
poodle.52 Because the act occurred in the course of one of the sexual
assaults, it was connected in time and place with the sexual activity
charged in the indictment.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the res gestae test is em-
ployed to admit a variety of collateral acts evidence against a defen-
dant accused of sexual abuse. However, because most evidence ad-
mitted via this mechanism would be admissible under Rule 404(b)
anyway, the res gestae exception is no longer necessary to provide
49. Id
50. IL
51. State v. Gilbert, 399 S.E.2d 851 (W. Va. 1991).
52. l at 854.
19931 1101
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"context" or a "full presentation"53 of the offense nor is the verbiage
useful to the evidentiary analysis.
E. The "Lusiful Disposition" Exception
One further exception to the general bar to collateral acts evidence
is the "lustful disposition" rule. Previously, the court had unequivocally
held that evidence to show the lustful disposition of the alleged perpe-
trator of a sexual crime was inadmissible.' Nonetheless, the court has
recently ruled that -evidence introduced to show lustful disposition is
admissible in cases involving child victims. 55 Thus, collateral acts evi-
dence is admissible "to show the perpetrator had a lustful disposition
towards the victim, a lustful disposition to children generally, or a
lustful disposition to specific other children, provided such acts oc-
curred reasonably close in time to the incident(s) giving rise to the
indictment. ' ' 6
In Edward Charles L, the court used the lustful disposition excep-
tion to-uphold the admission of evidence of acts directly involving the
victims, other than those charged in the indictment, and acts in which
the defendant ejaculated on his daughter's underwear and fondled an
infant boy. 7 The court reasoned that carving out a sexual propensity
exception aids the jury in weighing the credibility of the child victim's
uncorroborated testimony. The court argued that a jury is likely to
distrust the child's story for a number of reasons: (1) because child
sexual abuse is so abhorrent to our culture, most people prefer to
believe that the child's story of sexual abuse was fabricated or coached
or that the touching occurred by accident, such as during bathing; (2)
a child has difficulty establishing the precise dates of the incidents;
and (3) the child's story is pitted against an adult's version. Thus,
admitting evidence of sexual propensity provides for a fuller context of
the crime, reducing the incredibility of the child victim's testimony and
53. Edward Charles L, 398 S.E.2d at 129-30.
54. State v. Dolin, 347 S.E.2d 208, 215 (W. Va. 1986) (resolving prior inconsistent
cases regarding the sexual propensity exception).
55. Edward Charles L, 398 S.E.2d at 132.
56. i& at 133.
57. Ma at 131.
1102 [Vol. 95:1091
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permitting the jury to more fairly assess the credibility of both the
child victim and adult perpetrator.58
As Justice Miller pointed out in his dissent, the lustful disposition
exception is blatantly contrary to Rule 404(a) which prohibits evidence
of character to prove action in conformity with that character trait.5 9
"The rule that evidence of collateral crimes is not admissible to prove
guilt of the crime charged, but rather only to bear on subordinate
issues such as system, motive, or intent, is black letter law and is
explicitly stated in ... [Rule] 404(b). " 60 Moreover, Justice Miller
noted that the majority's position in Edward Charles L is followed by
only a distinct minority.61
The lustful disposition exception, like the res gestae exception,
serves to circumvent the rules of evidence. It is not a valid judicial
interpretation of an ambiguous rule, but a purely court-created rule that
flies in the face of a clear exclusion of character evidence offered to
prove that the defendant acted in conformity with his or her "lustful
disposition."
In addition, much evidence admitted under this exception would
most likely come in under Rule 404(b) to establish motive, opportuni-
ty, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. For example, in Edward Charles L, the evidence that the
defendant fondled an infant boy and ejaculated on his daughter's un-
derwear could arguably be admitted as proof of motive, intent, plan, or
absence of accident.62 It is similar to the evidence where the defen-
dant made the children listen to phone calls to sex clubs, viewed por-
nographic magazines with the children, and masturbated in front of his
58. l at 132-33.
59. Id. at 144 (Miller, J., dissenting).
60. Id
61. Id
62. The only evidence in Edward Charles L that the court found inadmissible was
that the defendant would pat the front of his pants, lean against the washing machine dur-
ing spin cycle, and masturbate after having sex. "[Tihis evidence was introduced solely for
the purpose of proving the character of the defendant and his propensity for obtaining sexu-
al gratification in unusual ways. There was no evidence that these particular instances either
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son, all of which was admitted to show that the acts did not occur
accidentally. 3 Likewise, this would be similar to the evidence in Gil-
bert, where the defendant had fondled the victim prior to the dates
charged in the indictment, which was admitted to show motive, intent,
or common plan or scheme.'
While it is clear that evidentiary standards need modification in
criminal child sexual abuse cases in order to accommodate the unique
needs and problems of child victims, the creation of the lustful dispo-
sition exception, in contravention of Rule 404, sacrifices the
defendant's light to be tried for his-actions and not his character.
IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. The State's Reliance on Expert Testimony
The inherent weakness of child sexual abuse cases, where often a
young, traumatized child is pitted against an apparently respectable
adult, has caused many prosecutors to bolster their cases with expert
testimony. 65 The extent of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cas-
es has been widely litigated.' Expert testimony offered in child mo-
lestation cases has ranged from testimony that explains why delays in
reporting are common to testimony that the child victim is telling the
truth. 7 In general, all expert testimony must assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidences and must be based on facts reasonably re-
lied upon by experts in the field.6 9 Courts have rejected expert tes-
63. Id. at 129-30 (noting that the defendant had attempted to establish that the acts
had occurred by accident).
64. State v. Gilbert, 399 S.E.2d 851, 857 (W. Va. 1990).
65. Rebecca Roe, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 97, 97 (1985).
66. See generally MOROSCO, supra note 7, § 9.07[2]. For a breakdown of state deci-
sions on this issue, see State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
67. Roe, supra note 64, at 97.
68. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, sldll, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." W. VA. R. EviD. 702.
69. W. VA.. R. EVID. 703.
1104 [Vol. 95:1091
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timony in child sexual abuse cases for failure to meet both of these
requirements.
B. The Edward Charles L. Rule
The rules regarding expert testimony in West Virginia were delin-
eated in State v. Edward Charles L.7 0 which held that an expert may
testify as to whether the child victim exhibits behaviors consistent with
other sexually abused victims and as to whether the child has been
sexually abused. However, an expert may not give an opinion as to the
credibility of the child or as to whether the defendant was the perpe-
trator of the abuse because such testimony would improperly invade
the province of the jury.71
The majority's acceptance of evidence of child sexual abuse syn-
drome is in accord with state precedent72 and the holding of a large
number of other jurisdictions.73 However, a glaring omission from the
court's analysis on this issue is the failure to distinguish between reha-
bilitative and affirmative use of syndrome evidence.
Evidence that a child has exhibited symptoms of child sexual
abuse syndrome is used rehabilitatively to protect a child witness's
credibility by explaining a child's secrecy, delayed disclosure, and
recantation.74 These behaviors could justifiably destroy an adult
victim's case, but a child who is a victim of sexual abuse, especially
by a family member, rarely promptly reports due to feelings of guilt,
shame, and fear. Therefore, evidence of child sexual abuse accommo-
70. 398 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1990).
71. State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 141 (W. Va. 1990).
72. State v. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that an expert may give
an opinion as to whether the victim of a sexual assault suffered from rape trauma syn-
drome).
73. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Ken v.
State, 347 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. CL App. 1986); State v. Reser, 767 P.2d 1277 (Kan. 1989);
State v. Garden, 404 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. CL App. 19887); State v. Walters, 806 P.2d 497
(Mont. 1991); Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705 (Nev. 1987); In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d
914 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989); State v. Timperio, 528
N.E.2d 594 (Ohio 1987); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988).
74. State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172, 181 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
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dation syndrome explains otherwise bizarre behavior so that jurors are
better able to assess the victim's credibility. Indeed, the child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome was intended to rebut assertions by
the defense that such behaviors indicate that a child is lying, thus
countering probable false assumptions by the jury.
Syndrome evidence is often used affirmatively by the prosecution.
The prosecution's expert witness attempts to establish that the child
has been sexually abused because he or she fits a behavioral "pro-
file."75 The "profile" of the sexually abused child includes the follow-
ing behaviors: age-inappropriate sexual knowledge, sexualized play,
precocious behavior, excessive masturbation, preoccupation with geni-
tals, indications of pressure or coercion exerted on the child, consisten-
cy of the child's story consistent over time, indications of an escalat-
ing progression of sexual abuse over time, ability of the child to de-
scribe idiosyncratic details of the abuse, and physical evidence of
abuse.76 However, "there is no single array of behavioral indicators
that will definitively identify a sexually abused child.",
77
Because the scientific community has not as yet reached a general
consensus that there are reliable indicators of child sexual abuse, many
courts have rejected affinative use of syndrome evidence. 78 The dis-
sent in Edward Charles L argued for just such a limitation on the use
of syndrome evidence:
While some courts have permitted a qualified expert to testify that a child
victim of sexual abuse displays symptoms of the typical child abuse pro-
file, there is almost universal agreement that the expert is not entitled...
to state in the absence of physical findings, that the child has been sexual-
ly abused.
79
75. WHTCoMB, supra note 1, at 115.
76. L at 20.
77. 1a
78. See, e.g., State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Johnson
v. State, 732 S.W.2d 817 (Ark. 1987); People v. Leon, 251 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1989);
Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1986); State v. Lawrence, 541 A.2d 1291
(Me. 1988); State v. Milbradt, 767 P.2d 620 (Or. 1988); State v. Hudnall, 359 S.E.2d 59
(S.C. 1987); State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
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In fact, the dissent seems to argue that testimony regarding the
child sexual abuse syndrome should not have been admitted for any
purpose in that particular case because the State made no attempt to
demonstrate the reliability of such evidence.' The dissent disagreed
with the majority's broad interpretation of Rule 702 to admit any
expert testimony which will assist the trier of fact: "We have never
interpreted [Rule 702] as an open door to admit any supposed scien-
tific testimony without some inquiry into its reliability."'" Therefore,
because the child sexual abuse profile is novel and not generally ac-
cepted, the State should have been required to bear the burden of
establishing its scientific reliability.82
Although the court in Edward Charles L did not address the
distinction between rehabilitative and affirmative use of syndrome
evidence, it appeared to approve of both uses because the expert at
trial had testified that the children had been sexually abused and as-
saulted. Accordingly, in West Virginia the rule seems to be that an
expert may directly opine that because a particular child exhibits be-
haviors characteristic of child sexual abuse syndrome that child has
been sexually abused, even though physical proof is lacking.
C. An Unnecessary Bolstering of Credibility?
In Edward Charles L, the court distinguished evidentiary usage of
child sexual abuse syndrome from rape trauma syndrome. In rape
cases, an expert may testify that the victim exhibits behavior charac-
teristic of rape trauma syndrome. However, the expert may not opine
that a victim was raped, absent physical findings, because such a con-
clusion based upon syndrome evidence would vouch too much for the
victim's credibility and give added weight to the claim that the defen-





83. State v. McCoy 366 S.E.2d 731, 736-37 (W. Va. 1988).
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To avoid this precedent, the court contended that in child sexual
abuse cases it is proper, even necessary, to bolster the credibility of
the victim because lay jurors cannot adequately assess the credibility
of sexually abused children who have delayed disclosure, recantation,
or confusion." Evidence that other sexually abused children have ex-
hibited the same behaviors, in order to accommodate the abuse, is
necessary to assist the jury in evaluating the child's credibility.85
Thus, the court's rationale for admitting syndrome evidence is based
on the rehabilitative theory. However, the court proceeds to allow in
the evidence for affirmative use without providing any additional rea-
soning to distinguish between rape trauma syndrome and child sexual
abuse syndrome. The court held that an expert is permitted to give an
opinion as to whether a child has been sexually abused on the basis of
behavioral characteristics, absent any physical findings 6; however, an
expert may not testify that a rape victim has been raped, absent physi-
cal proof, even though that victim exhibits behaviors characteristic of
rape trauma syndrome.87
Without some additional reasoning to justify affirmative use of
child sexual abuse syndrome, the court seems to be invading the prov-
ince of the jury in admitting expert testimony that the abuse actually
occurred. Testimony of this sort does not assist the jury in assessing
the child's credibility. Rather, it serves only to unfairly prejudice the
defendant, especially where identity is not disputed, and, as expert
opinion, carries substantial weight and legitimacy with the jury."8 The
child victim's credibility is fairly and justifiably bolstered by admitting
evidence that the child exhibits behaviors consistent with child sexual
abuse syndrome which alleviates any unfair assumptions by the jury.
However, it is simply not necessary to the prosecution's case nor fair
to the defendant to employ syndrome evidence for any further, affirma-
tive purpose.
84. State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 140 (W. Va. 1990).
85. l
86. Id. at 141.
87. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d at 736-37.
88. Edward Charles L, 398 S.E.2d at 147 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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A. The General Rule
The prosecutor often will seek to introduce a child's statements
made to parents, physicians, and counselors which disclose sexual
abuse. These statements may often provide crucial evidence because
physical evidence is routinely lacking and there are rarely other wit-
nesses to the abuse.89 In fact, if a child victim is not able to testify
at trial, the out of court statement provides thi only account of the
abuse.' Additionally, the out-of-court statement may be more detailed
and spontaneous than the child's later testimony in the formal and
intimidating arena of the courtroom.91
"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." 92 Hearsay evidence is generally excluded
because the statement was not made under oath and because the defen-
dant lacks the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the declar-
ant,93 thus there is no guarantee of trustworthiness.94 However, cer-
tain hearsay exceptions are frequently used to admit a child victim's
out-of-court statements of sexual abuse. The hearsay exceptions most
commonly used by prosecutors are: (1) excited utterances; (2) state-
ments made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment; and (3)
the residual hearsay exception.
B. The Excited Utterance Exception
An out-of-court statement is not excluded if it related to a star-
tling event or condition and was made while the declarant was under
89. EATMAN & BULKLEY, supra note 4, at 7.
90. ICL
91. ILd.
92. W. VA. R. EVin. 801(c).
93. MOROSCO, supra note 7, § 9.07, at 9-27.
94. See CLECKLEY, supra note 11, § 8.2(B).
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the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.9 5 The excit-
ed utterance exception is a useful tool for prosecutors seeking to intro-
duce a child's out of court disclosure of sexual abuse. 96 However,
this exception is subject to several limitations which diminish its use-
fulness in child sexual abuse cases.
First, the statement must relate to and explain or characterize the
event. Second, the statement must grow out of the event, not merely
narrate the occurrence. Third, the statement must be factual, not opin-
ion. Fourth, the statement must be spontaneous, not premeditated.
Fifth, the statement must be made at a time and under circumstances
that demonstrate its spontaneity. Sixth, the statement must be made by
a person who participated in or witnessed the event.'
The theory behind the excited utterance exception is that a person
"stimulated by the excitement of an event and acting under the influ-
ence of that event will lack the reflective capacity essential for fab-
rication."9" The determining factor is usually the length of time
elapsed between the event and the statement."
While some jurisdictions have stretched. the boundaries of the
excited utterance exception beyond recognition in child molestation
cases, permitting statements made days, weeks, or months after the
incident,10° West Virginia continues to rely heavily upon the length
of time elapsed between the statement and the abuse. °10 In State v.
Withrow," 2 where the child victim ran crying to her teacher immedi-
ately following the abuse and told her of the incident, the court held
95. W. VA. R. EVID. 802(2).
96. See generally MOROSCO, supra note 7, § 9.07[a]; EATMAN & BuLKLEY, supra
note 4, at 7; JAMES SELKiN, PH.D. & PETER G.W. SCHOUTEN, M.A., THE CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASE IN THE COURTROOM: A SOURCE BOOK 89-90 (1987); WHITCOMB, supra note
1, at 87-88.
97. State v. Jones, 362 S.E.2d 330, 331, syl. pt. 2 (WV. Va. 1987) (quoting State v.
Young, 273 S.E.2d 592, syl. pt. 2 (W. Va. 1980)).
98. I L at 333.
99. Id.
100. See WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 87; MOROSCO, supra note 7, § 9.07[a] at 9-28,
n.75.
101. CLECKLEY, supra note 11, § 8.7(3)(2).
102. 96 S.E.2d 913 (W. Va. 1957).
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that the teacher was permitted to testify as to the excited utter-
ance. 10 3 Similarly, where the child had been in a semi-conscious state
immediately following the incident and the child's statement was made
in response to a question asked by the doctor examining her, the excit-
ed utterance exception applied."U4 In contrast, it was held error to
permit a state trooper to testify as to statements the child made to him
six months after the incident.0 5
The requirement that the statement be nearly contemporaneous
with the event poses difficulties in child sexual abuse cases because
child victims frequently delay disclosure of the abuse. Reasons for
delayed disclosure may include "threats made by the defendant, fears
of not being believed, feeling of confusion and guilt, and efforts to
forget.' 0
6
Likewise, the element of spontaneity is often problematic for two
reasons. First, the child may not know that the abuse is wrong, so the
child may appear unconcerned or casual when relating it. Second, the
child may be concerned, but will not disclose the abuse until directly
questioned.10 In both of these situations, the element of spontaneity
may be lacking."
C. The Medical Statement Exception
Like the excited utterance exception, the exception for statements
made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis is often success-
fully used to admit a child victim's out-of-court disclosure of sex
abuse. The rule requires that the statement be made for purposes of
medical treatment or diagnosis, describe past or present symptoms,
103. Id, at 926.
104. State v. Swiger, 336 S.E.2d 541, 549 n.8 (W. Va. 1985).
105. State v. Jones, 362 S.E.2d 330, 333 (W. Va. 1987).
106. WtnTcoMB, supra note 1, at 87.
107. But see King v. State, 631 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App.) ("the authorities make
it clear that the fact that a statement is a response to a question is but one factor to con-
sider in determining its spontaneity"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928 (1982).
108. WH1rCOMB, supra note 1, at 88.
19931 1111
21
Brown: Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse: A Survey of Evidentiary Modificat
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
medical history, or general character of the cause or source, and be
reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis."l 9
The premise behind the medical statement exception is the notion
that the declarant has a strong motivation to be truthful when seeking
medical treatment ° The trustworthiness of the statement is assured
because the patient is likely to believe that the success of medical
treatment depends on the accuracy of the information provided to the
physician."1
In West Virginia, the medical statement exception has been
stretched to accommodate child sexual abuse victims. In State v. Ed-
ward Charles L., the court admitted statements made to the child's
psychologist in a therapeutic context.11 2 The court adopted the two-
part test formulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Morgan v. Foretich:"' "(1) the [child's] motive in
making the statement must be consistent with the purposes of promot-
ing treatment; and (2) the content of the statement must be such as is
reasonably relied upon by a physician in treatment or diagnosis. 11 4
In Edward Charles L, the court held that the child's statements to
a psychologist describing several incidents of sexual abuse were admis-
sible because the child's mother brought the child to the psychologist
for the purpose of treatment prior to the institution of any criminal
proceedings, and the psychologist would reasonably rely upon the
child's statements in diagnosing and treating the child.115 Thus, it is
not necessary that the statements are made for a medical purpose;
those made for psychological diagnosis and treatment are also admissi-
ble.
The traditional example of the limited usefulness of the medical
statement exception proceeds as follows: a physician may testify that
109. W. VA. R. EVID. 803(4).
110. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note (W. VA. R. EVID. 803(4) is the
same as the federal rule).
111. EDWARD W. CLEARY Er AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 292 (3d ed. 1984).
112. 398 S.E.2d 123, 134-36 (W. Va. 1990).
113. 846 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir. 1988).
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the declarant stated he or she was hit by a car, but the physician may
not testify that the declarant stated who was driving that car because
the identity of the negligent driver is not pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment. This limitation does not hold true after Edward Charles L,
because the psychologist was permitted to testify that the child told
him the identity of the perpetrator of the abuse. Of course, the identity
of a child's molester will usually be relevant and necessary to psychi-
atric treatment of the child, especially if the perpetrator is a family
member. The identity of the perpetrator is also relevant to medical
treatment if the child is diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease.
Thus, while identity is not normally admissible under the medical
statement exception, it will be admitted in child sexual abuse cases.
Although the majority in Edward Charles L reached a legitimate
result regarding the medical statement exception in that case, the ex-
tension of the exception to include disclosure of identity gives cause
for concern. As the dissent noted, "[a]t their young age, children can
lack the maturity to appreciate the link between their statements and
the treatment," thus obviating the theory behind the exception." 6 A
possible solution, suggested by the dissent, is to require an in camera
hearing in which the prosection would bear the burden of proving that
the child understood the duty to provide the doctor or psychologist
with accurate information in order to obtain proper treatment. If the
prosecution is unable to meet its burden, the hearsay must be excluded
because there statement lacks the requisite trustworthiness. 7
D. The Catch-All Exception
Prosecutors may attempt to admit a child's hearsay statement,
which cannot be admitted as an excited utterance or medical statement,
under Rule 803(24) or its counterpart 804(b)(5), which are known as
the catch-all or residual exceptions.
Both exceptions require that the following elements are met before
hearsay is admitted: (1) the trustworthiness of the statement must be
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equivalent to the trustworthiness underlying the specific exceptions to
the hearsay rule; (2) the statement must be offered to prove a material
fact; (3) The statement must be more probative than any other evi-
dence that can reasonably be procured; (4) the admission of the state-
ment must comport with the general purpose of the evidentiary rules




In the Rule 803 series of hearsay exceptions, it is immaterial
whether the declarant is available to testify. Because the declarant is
available to testify, the defendant's right of confrontation is usually not
implicated. Thus, the prosecution seeking to introduce a child's hearsay
statements through Rule 803(24) need only show that the statement
bears circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those
upon which the specific hearsay exceptions are based.
Rule 803(24) was used to admit hearsay evidence in Edward
Charles L..9 The mother in that case was permitted to testify that
her son told her about the sexual abuse. The court found that the
guarantees of trustworthiness were satisfied because the children in-
volved testified at trial and were subject to cross-examination, and the
mother did not add anything substantive to the children's testimony.
The court apparently placed great weight on the fact that the chil-
dren did testify in court, thus minimizing the dangers of hearsay. How-
ever, because the presence of the declarant is not a guarantee of trust-
worthiness for any of the specific hearsay exceptions, it should not be
factored into an analysis of the trustworthiness of hearsay under the
catch-all exception. The presence of the declarant is relevant only to
the constitutional right of confrontation, not to the trustworthiness of
the hearsay.
More relevant factors that the court should have considered in its
analysis of the hearsay's trustworthiness include whether the statement
118. W. VA. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
119. 398 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1990).
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was made under oath, the amount of time elapsed between the event
and the statement, any motivation to speak truthfflly, and whether the
declarant had firsthand knowledge. 120 Because the right to confronta-
tion may not be an issue if the declarant testifies and is available for
cross-examination, factors other than those present when the statement
was made may be relevant in determining the trustworthiness of the
statement.
2. Rule 804(b)(5)
Rule 804(b)(5) may only be used when the declarant is unavail-
able to testify. Because the declarant is unavailable, the defendant's
right of confrontation is implicated when hearsay is admitted under the
catch-all exception and the requirements are more stringent.
Under 804(b)(5), the prosecution must first prove that the declar-
ant is unavailable to testify. The prosecution must make a "good faith
effort" to secure the witness, which must be reflected in the court
record. 121 Unavailability occurs most frequently when the child is
found incompetent to testify by the court. The prosecution may also be
able to show unavailability if testifying poses a danger of severe psy-
chological injury to the child, or if the child has displayed unwilling-
ness or inability to testify.'2
The prosecution must then prove that the hearsay bears "adequate
indicia of reliability" with a showing of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.'1 23 The Supreme Court of the United States ad-
dressed this issue in Ohio v. Roberts12 4 in which the court held that
when a declarant is unavailable to testify, hearsay must be excluded
unless it bears adequate indicia of reliability. The reliability re--
quirement is met where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted ex-
ception. However, reliability will not be inferred if the statement does
120. See CLEARY, supra note 110, § 324.1, at 908.
121. State v. James Edward S., 400 S.E.2d 843, 848 (W. Va. 1990).
122. WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 92.
123. James Edward S., 400 S.E.2d at 849 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980)).
124. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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not fall within one of the longstanding exceptions. If the statement is
introduced under the catch-all exception, the proponent must show
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. " 125
In Idaho v. Wright,126 the Supreme Court expanded upon Ohio v.
Roberts, to define "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." In
Idaho v. Wright, the prosecution sought to introduce statements made
by the child victim, who did not testify, to an examining physician.
The Court held that it was error to admit the evidence under the resid-
ual exception. The Court noted that a statement might not satisfy the
Confrontation Clause even though it met the requirements of the hear-
say rule 27; in other words, "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" as required by the Confrontation Clause is a higher standard than
the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" required by the 'resid-
ual hearsay exception.
The trustworthiness of the hearsay must come from the totality of
the circumsta-mces. The circumstances may include only those present
at the time the statement was made which make the statement worthy
of belief and which would make cross-examination of the declarant of
marginal value.1 28 This would include whether the child had a moti-
vation to lie and whether the child's description of the abuse was
consistent with the abilities and knowledge of a child of that age.
Corroborating evidence may not be considered because it is not perti-
nent to the naking of the statement itself' 29 Thus evidence of physi-
cal findings, statements from other witnesses, and the defendant's
opportunity to commit the abuse may not be used to demonstrate the
trustworthiness of the hearsay statement.1°
The leading West Virginia case on Rule 804(b)(5) is State v.
James Edward S." In that case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia held that the trial court improperly allowed a social
125. Id. at 65.
126. 110 U.S. 3139 (1990).
127. Id. at 3146.
128. Id at 3148.
129. Id. at 3150.
130. WHrcorMB, supra note 1, at 94.
131. 400 S.E.2d 843 (W. Va. 1990).
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worker to testify about statements made to her by the child victim's
sister, who had run away."' The court ruled that because the de-
clarant did not testify the defendant's right to confrontation was im-
plicated, thus the unavailability and trustworthiness requirements must
be satisfied. First, the court found that the unavailability requirement
was not met because the record devoid of evidence that the prosecu-
tion made a good faith effort to locate the declarant. 33 Second, the
court held that the trustworthiness requirement was not met because
the trial court failed to make a record to support its decision on ad-
miissibility. 13
3. A Special Hearsay Exception for Sexually Abused Children?
Over half of the states have enacted special hearsay exceptions for
sexually abused children. These statutes comport with the Ohio v.
Roberts minimum standards of trustworthiness for admissibility of
hearsay, and many have instituted additional stringent requirements,
such as corroboration of the act or corroboration of the statement.
Others are limited to particular statements, such as those describing the
acts of sexual abuse, or to particular persons, such as a parent.
Because so many of the special hearsay exceptions have more
stringent requirements than those required by the Confrontation Clause,
it appears that the statutes have been enacted out of public concern
that "defendants might otherwise be convicted solely on the basis of
hearsay statements from a child witness who is unavailable for cross-
examination."1 35 These special statutes serve not only to protect the
defendant's interests, but also to prevent the continued stretching of
available exceptions to the point where the original intent of the ex-
ception is lost.
36
West Virginia does not currently have a special hearsay exception
for sexually abused children. Although there is increasing public con-
132. ld at 846.
133. Id. at 848. -
134. Id. at 850-51.
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cern that innocent defendants are being convicted as a result of wide-
spread hysteria about child molestation, the high standards for trust-
worthiness put forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Ohio v. Roberts and Idaho v. Wright are a sufficient check against
unreliable hearsay. It is not necessary to set even higher standards
which will effectively prevent a jury from hearing much of what a
child victim has said about the sexual abuse. This is because most of
a child's statements regarding the abuse will not fall within any of the
specific exceptions and the existing trustworthiness standards for the
residual exception are indeed difficult to satisfy.
VI. CONCLUSION
West Virginia has made substantial evidentiary modifications in
the areas discussed in this Note, generally showing a strong favor
toward accommodating the special needs of child victims and witness-
es. Only in regards to competency has the court leaned in the
defendant's favor, requiring in camera hearings to determine a child's
competence to testify. As the other three issues discussed in this Note
demonstrate, the court has displayed extreme leniency toward the ad-
-missibility of character evidence, expert testimony, and hearsay, all of
which facilitate the prosecution of defendants accused of child sexual
abuse. The court permits res gestae and lustful disposition evidence
against the defendant, which allows the prosecution to try the defen-
dant for his character rather than for the criminal acts alleged in an
indictment. The court allows experts to testify that a child has been
sexually abused based on a psychological test, child sexual abuse ac-
commodation syndrome, which was not developed for the purpose of
determining whether molestation occurred. The court admits hearsay
evidence, under the catch-all exception, which is evaluated under stan-
dards inadequate to insure that the requisite degree of trustworthiness
is met. Thus, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has
shown a clear and certain trend toward accommodating the special
needs of the sexually abused child and easing the burdens on the
prosecution in presenting its case. While evidentiary modifications,
such as easing competency hurdles for child witnesses, are necessary
1118 [Vol. 95:1091
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss4/9
1993] EVIDENTIARY MODIFICATIONS 1119
to rectify past inequities, the defendant's rights should not be over-
looked in an attempt to smooth the way for a conviction.
Kelley L Brown
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